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Abstract
The application of formal techniques can contribute much to the quality of software, which
is of utmost importance for safety-critical embedded systems. These techniques, however, are
not easy to apply. In particular, methodological guidance is often unsatisfactory. We address this
problem by the concept of an agenda. An agenda is a list of activities to be performed for solving
a task in software engineering. Agendas used to support the application of formal specication
techniques provide detailed guidance for speciers, templates of the used specication language
that only need to be instantiated, and application independent validation criteria. We apply the
agenda approach to a particular class of embedded safety-critical systems, the formal specication
of which has been investigated in the case-studies of the German project during the last two
years. c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Every software-based system potentially benets from the application of formal tech-
niques. For the development of mission or even safety-critical embedded systems, how-
ever, their use is of particular advantage, because the potential damage operators and
developers have to envisage in case of malfunction may be much worse than the ad-
ditional costs of applying formal techniques in system development.
A major drawback of formal techniques is that they are not easy to apply for the
average software engineer. Besides the facts that users of formal techniques need an
appropriate education and have to deal with lots of details, they are often left alone
with a mere formalism without any guidance on how to use it. Hence, methodological
support is a key issue to bring formal techniques into practice.
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Fig. 1. Basic ESPRESS process model.
Methodological support for specication development must be abstract enough to
cover a signicant range of applications, but also detailed enough to provide real guid-
ance to developers. To achieve this aim, the problem-related ne-grained knowledge
acquired by experienced developers needs to be made explicit and represented in a
way that supports its reuse. Agendas, as introduced in [20,22], provide a concept for
representing methodological process knowledge for particular software architectures on
a relatively ne-grained level of detail.
In this paper, we demonstrate the application of the concept of agendas to a particular
class of embedded safety-critical systems. The architecture we study is that of a cyclic
software component { a piece of software in a technical system which is triggered in
regular time intervals by its environment to compute output values (usually commands
to some actuators) from given input values (usually sensor values), and an internal state.
The agenda we present for this architecture is condensed from case studies performed
in the ESPRESS project. 1
Fig. 1 shows the basic ESPRESS process model. The agenda presented in this
paper guides the development of a requirements specication. Such a requirements
1 The ESPRESS project is a cooperation of industry and research institutes funded by the German ministry
BMBF (\Forderschwerpunkt Softwaretechnologie") from 1995 to 1998.
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specication is further validated and serves as a basis for safety analyses, test case
generation, and software design.
Our agenda for cyclic software components elaborates on two particular aspects
of embedded systems, motivated by the demands of the ESPRESS application context.
First, special care is taken to accurately develop the embedding of the software in
its surrounding technical system. Second, quality requirements such as high-level or
safety-related conditions which have to be guaranteed by the software need to be
treated systematically. The general ESPRESS methodology requires that { if possible {
these requirements are specied as properties, which have to be logical consequences
of an explicitly constructed model of the software. The redundancy introduced by this
approach increases the potential for checking the consistency of the formal specication.
It also supports a development situation where model construction and model properties
are dened by dierent teams.
Outline of this paper. Section 2 introduces the ESPRESS notations and tools we use.
In Section 3 we discuss the concept of an agenda in general. Section 4 presents the
concrete agenda for cyclic software components and its application to the case study
of an intelligent cruise control system. In Section 5, we discuss related work, before
concluding in Section 6.
2. Notations and tools
We use the ESPRESS notation SZ [2,3] to express the specications developed with
our agenda for cyclic software components. This notation provides a semantically well-
dened combination of the Statemate languages [17] (namely statecharts and activity
charts), the formal specication language Z [40], and an extension of Z by temporal
interval logic [5]. The Statemate languages and Z have been chosen for ESPRESS because
of their relevance in industrial contexts and their fairly good tool support. Interval logic
is used because of its relation to nondeterministic automata and regular expressions,
concepts which are familiar to engineers.
2.1. Outline of SZ
A SZ specication consists of so-called process class denitions, which cluster
pieces of the constituting notations. A process class describes the interfaces and be-
havior of a set of processes, the instances of the class. Fig. 2 shows the components
of a process class:
 A specication of the process structure, i.e. aggregation and association with in-
stances of other classes, and the data-ow between these instances. This is repre-
sented by Statemate’s activity charts [17].
 A specication of the data space of the process, including constant denitions, data
shared with the environment, internal data, and transformations of data. The data
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Fig. 2. The notations of SZ.
space is specied using conventional Z { except that schemas may have associated
a certain role in the context of the process class. Schema roles include
PORT { declares data shared by the process with the environment.
DATA { declares data private to the process.
INIT { constraints the initial value of the data space.
GUARD { species a condition on the data space.
OP { species an operation (a transformation of the data state).
PROPERTY { species an invariant of the data space.
 A specication of the dynamic behavior of the process, based on statecharts. The
transitions of statecharts are labelled with pairs of GUARD and OP schemas. A
transition is taken if its source state is active, and the guard schema is true on the
current data state. Its eect is a transformation of the data state as specied by the
OP schema.
 A specication of selected dynamic properties which are asserted for the process,
expressed by an embedding of discrete temporal interval logic into Z. These are
given in special schemas tagged with the phrase ASSERTION DYN.
2.2. Semantics of SZ
The semantic foundation of SZ is not subject of this paper. Our agenda for cyclic
software components expressed in SZ can be understood without a deeper
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understanding of the semantics of SZ. For those readers interested in this subject, we
informally describe some aspects of the semantics below. Basic knowledge of Z and
Statecharts is assumed.
Data view. Let Data denote the conjunction of all the schemas with role DATA
in a process class, Port with role PORT , Property with role PROPERTY , and Init
with role INIT . The data space of a process class is given by the schema DataSpace,
the bindings of which represent the admissible data state at any point in time:
DataSpace b= [Port; Data jProperty]
Let seq1  represent a type constructor for the set of innite sequences of elements
of . Then the admissible data traces of a process class, as induced by the data space
specication, are dened as
DataTraces == ft : seq1DataSpace j t 1 2 Initg
Dynamic view. The traces of the data view are a superset of the traces which result
from an adaption of the statechart step algorithm to our model. We give a informal
explanation of this adaption, which is the major gluing point of our semantic integration
of Statecharts and Z. For a detailed description of the conventional statechart step
algorithm see [18].
The input for the step algorithm is the current process status , i.e. the set of
Statechart-states the process currently resides in and a binding of the schema
DataSpace. Using this information, the set of enabled transitions is computed. A
transition is enabled if all of its source states are active and the guard of its label is
true for the data binding. From this set, a maximal non-conicting 2 set is computed
by removing those transitions that are in conict with an enabled transition of higher
priority, 3 and non-deterministically removing transitions that have equal priority with
conicting transitions.
From the maximal set of non-conicting transitions, the transformation to perform
on the data state is synthesised by merging the Z operations of the non-conicting
transitions. The main complication here is to treat racing, the situation where two or
more operations of the non-conicting transitions write the same variable. To this end,
the operations are grouped according to common variables they write: whenever two
operations have a common variable x0 in their signature, they are joined to the same
group. Let Opij be the operations such that j ranges over the groups and ij over the
operations in each group. Then the merged data state transformation is dened in Z as
follows:
Opfire b=
n^
j=1
nj_
i=1
Opij
2 Two transitions are said to be in conict if the intersection of the set of states they are exiting is
non-empty.
3 A transition has a higher priority than another transition if its context is an ancestor of the other
transition’s context.
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Thus inside each group one operation is chosen non-deterministically, whereas the
groups altogether are executed in parallel. The non-deterministic choice inside a group
reects racing resolution on the level of Z operations.
To describe the actual data transformation associated with a step, two further details
need to be considered: ensuring that invariants specied in the data view of a process
class are treated, and ensuring that those variables which are not written in a step keep
persistent. Let W denote the set of variables not written by Opfire (i.e. those variables
whose primed version do not appear in the signature) and which are not declared to
be derived: 4
Opstep b=Opre ^DataSpace ^ (DataSpacenW )
It is required that the precondition of the synthesised operation Opstep be true under
the current variable binding. Otherwise the step algorithm is undened for the given .
Thus the step algorithm is a partial, nondeterministic mapping (relation) from process
states to process states. Since the transitions are non-conicting, and pre Opstep needs
to hold for , it is ensured that the new process status 0 { if existent { is valid
according to the statecharts structure and is an element of DataSpace.
Temporal view. For the temporal model properties, a trace semantics is used. The
correctness of a model according to its temporal properties is stated by ModelTraces )
TemporalTraces (or ModelTracesTemporalTraces, resp.), where ModelTraces are
those traces which can be constructed from applying the step algorithm to the initial
states of a process class. A more detailed account of the temporal semantics we use is
given in [5].
2.3. Tool support for SZ
As the integrated notations of SZ are syntactically and semantically preserved, tools
for them can be reused. \Glueware" has been designed in ESPRESS to constitute a tool
environment which integrates existing tools such as Statemate, the deduction system
Isabelle [34], the model checker SMV [30], the extendable text editor XEmacs, and
newly written tools developed in ESPRESS, such as the embedding of Z in the higher-
order logic of Isabelle, HOLZ [28], a type checker for SZ, a compiler for Z, and
others. In the resulting environment, whose principal design is described in [6], SZ
specications can be edited, browsed, analysed by deduction and model checking, and
executed for the purpose of animation. For the agenda we present in this paper, the
following capabilities are of particular interest:
 With HOLZ we can derive preconditions of operations, check for the existence
of initial states and the consistency of invariants, and analyse the completeness of
transitions of statecharts.
4SZ allows variables of the data space to be agged as derived from the value of other variables. The
value of these variables is implicitly dened in each step from the invariants of the data view. Semantically,
this just means that those variables are not subject of implicit persistency.
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Fig. 3. Screenshot of a session with the ESPRESS Tool Environment.
 With SMV we can model-check the validity of temporal model properties w.r.t. the
constructed model.
The screenshot in Fig. 3 shows a session with the ESPRESS tool environment, working
on the specication of an intelligent cruise control system, which has been developed
using the agenda for cyclic software components we present in this paper. The charts
edited under Statemate are automatically mirrored in the view of the SZ specication
edited under XEmacs. The analysis tools are running in the background, and can be
activated by context-sensitive popup-menus associated with the SZ text.
3. Agendas
Software development comprises a number of development activities, the result of
each of which is an artifact, such as a requirements document, a formal specica-
tion, program code, and test cases. Experienced software engineers have over time ac-
quired problem-related ne-grained knowledge how to perform the various development
activities.
To date, such expert knowledge is rarely made explicit. This forces each software
engineer to gain experience from scratch. Previously acquired knowledge is not re-used
to support software processes and not employed to educate novices.
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An agenda is a means to explicitly represent software development knowledge. It
gives guidance on how to perform a specic software development activity. Agendas
can be used for structuring quite dierent activities in dierent contexts. We have
set up and used agendas that support requirements engineering, specication acquisi-
tion, software design using architectural styles, and developing code from specications
[19]. Agendas are especially suitable to support the application of formal techniques
in software engineering.
An agenda is a list of steps to be performed when carrying out some task in the
context of software engineering. The result of the task will be a document expressed in
a certain language. Agendas contain informal descriptions of the steps. With each step,
templates of the language in which the result of the task is expressed are associated.
The templates are instantiated when the step is performed. The steps listed in an agenda
may depend on each other. Usually, they will have to be repeated to achieve the goal,
similar to the general process proposed by the spiral model of software engineering.
Agendas are presented as tables, see Fig. 5. Agendas may be nested, and we call the
\super-steps" stages (see, e.g., Fig. 4).
Agendas are not only a means to guide software development activities. They also
support quality assurance because the steps of an agenda may have validation conditions
associated with them. These validation conditions state necessary conditions that the
artifact must fulll in order to serve its purpose properly. When formal techniques are
applied, some of the validation conditions can be expressed and proven in a formal
way. Since the validation conditions that can be stated in an agenda are necessarily
application independent, the developed artifact should be further validated with respect
to application dependent needs.
Working with agendas proceeds as follows: rst, the software engineer selects an
appropriate agenda for the task at hand. Usually, several agendas will be available
for the same development activity, which capture dierent approaches to perform the
activity. This rst step requires a basic understanding of the problem to be solved.
Once the appropriate agenda is selected, the further procedure is xed to a large
extent. Each step of the agenda must be performed, in an order that respects the
dependencies of steps. The informal description of the step informs the software en-
gineer about the purpose of the step. The templates associated with the step pro-
vide the software engineer with patterns that can just be lled in (which nevertheless
requires creativity) or modied according to the needs of the application at hand.
The result of each step is a concrete expression of the language that is used to
express the artifact. If validation conditions are associated with a step, they should
be checked immediately to avoid unnecessary dead ends in the development. When
all steps of the agenda have been performed, a product has been developed that
can be guaranteed to fulll certain application-independent quality criteria. This prod-
uct should then be subject to further validation, taking the specic application into
account.
Agendas do not aim at replacing creativity, but they tell the software engineer what
needs to be done and help avoid omissions and inconsistencies. Their advantage lies
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in an improvement of the quality of the developed products and in the possibility for
reusing the knowledge incorporated in an agenda.
4. Agenda for cyclic software components
The agenda for cyclic software components consists of three stages, which are shown
in Fig. 4. Stage 1 must be performed rst; Stages 2 and 3 can be performed inde-
pendently of each other. Each of the stages is performed following a sub-agenda, as
described below. As a running example, we use an intelligent cruise control system,
which serves to automatically adjust the speed of a vehicle according to the driver’s
request. In addition to this conventional cruise control functionality, our version uses
a sensor to detect a vehicle driving ahead, and adjusts the speed to maintain a certain
safety distance. This example is extracted from one of the internal ESPRESS case studies,
and modied for our illustration purposes.
Stage 1: context embedding. Embedded software is characterised by the fact that the
interfaces to the environment are not standardised to a degree as it is nowadays common
for software running on e.g. workstations. Hence, a developer of software for embedded
systems should take special care to model the context embedding of the software. In
ESPRESS, the context denition also serves as a starting point for a simulation of the
software, using the Statemate tool. The sub-agenda for context embedding is shown in
Fig. 5.
Step 1.1: Specify technical interfaces. The technical interfaces of an embedded soft-
ware component are usually determined during system design, and cannot be modied
by the software developer. Since their characteristics and capabilities may have signif-
icant inuence on the further development, the rst step of context embedding is to
describe the technical interfaces in the modelling language.
Fig. 5 gives templates for describing technical interfaces in our modelling language
SZ. The structuring entities of SZ are process classes (the outer boxes in the gure,
e.g., TechnicalDefs), which are containers for sets of plain Z declarations, of schema
denitions, and of Statemate statecharts and activity charts. The schema denitions
inside a class may have assigned certain roles. For example, the role of schema def-
initions introduced with the keyword PORT is to describe data variables that can
be shared by a process with its environment. Interpreted standalone, PORT schemata
Fig. 4. Stages of the agenda for cyclic software components.
40 W. Grieskamp et al. / Science of Computer Programming 40 (2001) 31{57
Fig. 5. Steps of Stage 1: context embedding.
do not dier from plain Z schemata. However, they contribute to the semantics of
an entire process class, dening the variables belonging to the shared data state of
instances of the class, as described in Section 2.
For Step 1:1, the agenda in Fig. 5 suggests to collect the technical interfaces in
process classes called TechnicalSensors and TechnicalActuators, respectively, which
contain sets of PORT schemata. The types and constants used to dene these ports
are collected in a third process class, TechnicalDefs, which is included by the other
classes. The inclusion of process classes can be interpreted as textual expansion.
The validation conditions associated with Step 1:1 rst require the developer to
carefully check whether the types dened to model the values of sensors and actuators
really capture the technical properties of the technical sensors and actuators. The second
validation condition suggests to dene appropriate error values for the types. Finally,
all invariants must be satisable, i.e., there must exist legal states of the system ports,
which can be checked with HOLZ in our tool environment.
Validation conditions marked with \" are informal, whereas validation conditions
marked with \‘" are formal and hence can be checked with the ESPRESS tools.
Cruise control. Fig. 7 shows how we apply Step 1:1 to the specication of the cruise
control. The port Lever describes the driver’s control lever, which can be used to turn
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Fig. 6. Steps of Stage 1: context embedding cont.
Fig. 7. Technical interfaces of the cruise control.
o the cruise control, to increase or decrease the requested speed, to turn o the cruise
control, and to resume its operation. The port Pedal models the brake pedal, the port
Ahead the distance and relative acceleration with respect to a vehicle driving ahead,
and the port Movement provides information about the current speed and acceleration
of the vehicle. The port Adjustment describes the output of the cruise control, which
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consists of an engine torque and a (negative) acceleration for controlling the brake.
Variables declared as x : option A carry values of A which may be available or not; we
use dfd x to indicate whether the value of the optional variable x is available, val x to
refer to that value (if it is dened), and def v to construct a dened value from v. If,
e.g., the value of the sensor distAhead is not dened, then no vehicle driving ahead is
detected, and if the actuator engineTorque is not dened, then the cruise control does
not aect the engine.
We do not present the full specication of the technical interfaces of the cruise
control system here. In reality, the technical interfaces are based on the CAN bus
architecture. For illustration purposes, we have introduced just one \technical" interface,
which will be abstracted in the next section: the port Adjustment.
Step 1.2: Design and specify logical interfaces. Apart from being non-standardised,
the technical interfaces of an embedded software component may be also on a relatively
low technical level, which hinders a problem-oriented specication. It may therefore
be useful to introduce abstractions of the technical interfaces, which is achieved by
dening logical interfaces.
The values of the logical sensors should be totally and uniquely dened by the
technical sensors, and the technical actuators should be totally and uniquely dened by
the logical actuators (see validation conditions associated with this step). In the simplest
case, this mapping can be dened by a conversion function which maps a technical
sensor to a logical sensor or a logical actuator to a technical actuator, respectively.
In more complex situations, the mapping may require an internal state, for example
if a logical sensor accumulates the values of a technical one. In any case, we dene
the mapping by a dedicated process class that describes the conversion by a property
schema or by a statechart (in the template of Fig. 5, these classes are called MapLS1
and MapLA1, respectively). These process classes are instantiated as sub-processes of
the overall process modelling the system context, as will be seen in the next step.
The rst validation condition associated with Step 1:2 suggests to apply fault tol-
erance techniques, e.g., consistency checks on sensor values and feedback control to
check if actuator commands have been executed appropriately.
Cruise control. We introduce a logical actuator nominalAccel, which abstracts from
the two quite technical values engineControl and brakeControl given in the output
port Adjustment, as sketched in Fig. 8. The process class MapNominalAccel performs
the mapping of the logical to the technical actuators.
Proving the last two validation conditions amounts to proving that the function
accel2torque dened in the class LogicalDefs is indeed a total function.
Step 1.3: Derive software=context information ow. The description of the technical
interfaces, the logical interfaces, and their mapping induces an activity chart, which is
derived from the template given for Step 1:3 in Fig. 6. The activity charts of Statemate
used in SZ combine the descriptions of information ow, of instantiation of sub-
processes from process classes (rectangular boxes), and of behaviour described by
statecharts (rounded boxes). In Fig. 5, the overall description of the system’s behaviour
aggregates a sub-process Software, as well as sub-processes for mapping technical to
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Fig. 8. Logical interfaces of the cruise control.
logical interfaces. The information ows between these processes are labelled with
ports, and semantically describe visibility of shared variables between processes. The
aggregation of the statechart Control and the dotted lines are only for documentation
purposes; they indicate that Control schedules the activity of the sub-process Software.
The scheduler dened by Control applies to any cyclic software component devel-
oped using this agenda, and is quite simple. It assumes that the software, once run-
ning, reads the sensors, computes the actuators, and then suspends itself. The scheduler
thus periodically resumes the software in intervals of a certain cycle time. Notation-
ally, Statemate’s mechanism for suspending and resuming processes (processes are
also called activities in Statemate) is used. The Statemate action sd ! (SOFTWARE)
stands for suspending a process, rs ! (SOFTWARE) for resuming, and the condition
hg(SOFTWARE) tests whether a process is \hanging", that is suspended. The event
tm(en(RUN),CYCLETIME) appears cycleTime time units after the state RUN has been
entered, where en stands for \entered", and tm stands for \timeout". Because the result
of Step 1:3 can be derived schematically from the parts of the specication dened in
Steps 1:1 and 1:2, there are no validation conditions associated with this step.
Cruise control. Fig. 9 shows the result of Step 1:3. We only need to draw the
activity chart (where the information ows are already induced by Steps 1:1 and 1:2);
the statechart Control can be taken as is from the template in Fig. 5. Only Software
is renamed to CruiseControl.
Stage 2: Quality requirements. The systems we study have to full certain quality
requirements. Typical examples are safety requirements, but also high-level require-
ments from earlier development phases may be transferred to the software development
phase. A common characteristic of quality requirements is that they only address certain
selected aspects to be realized by the software { these aspects are important enough
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Fig. 9. Activity chart of the cruise control context.
to be emphasised explicitly in the specication. Technically, quality requirements are
formulated as model properties, which have to be logical consequences of the model
of the software as it is constructed in Stage 3. With model properties, redundancy is
deliberately introduced in the specication. This contributes to the potential for check-
ing consistency by deduction, model checking, and systematic testing. Fig. 10 describes
the agenda for treating quality requirements.
Step 2.1: Collect relevant quality requirements. The quality requirements are usually
dened during system design. In this step, the ones that are relevant for the software
component under development are collected and documented.
Cruise control. A few of the quality requirements are the following:
 Activity. The cruise control is allowed to adjust speed only if the driver has activated
it through the control lever, and did not deactivate it since then.
 Asymptotic string stability. If several vehicles using the cruise control drive in a
queue, a sudden change of the speed of one of them must lead to changes of speed
of the following vehicles which fade away along the queue.
Because cruise control systems are already on the market, these requirements are well
understood and known to be realizable with our technical interfaces. Hence, the vali-
dation condition associated with this step is fullled.
Step 2.2: Specify model properties. It is not realistic to demand that all quality
requirements be specied formally as model properties. For example, the property of
string stability cannot be expressed easily, because it would require to formalise aspects
of the mathematics of control theory. 5 However, where it is possible, the quality
requirements should be expressed as model properties, to be treated automatically in a
review stage later on.
A useful guideline for specifying the model properties is to rst introduce abstractions
of common situations observable on the interfaces. In the template of Fig. 10, these
5 In fact, notions of control theory could be expressed in Z, but ESPRESS does not aim at these goals.
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Fig. 10. Steps of Stage 2: quality requirements.
Fig. 11. Model properties of the cruise control.
are introduced by the schemata Obs1, Obs2, and applied in the temporal formula of
the assertion box.
The rst (informal) validation condition suggests that the model properties be ori-
ented on a classication of the relevant situations of the observable behaviour of the
system, whereas the second validation condition is an obvious consistency requirement.
Cruise control. In Fig. 11, we dene schemata for observing the situations where the
driver activates and deactivates the cruise control, and where the cruise control produces
an output value to adjust speed. These schemata are used to formalise one of the quality
requirements, namely the safety-condition \Activity". Intuitively, the temporal formula
given in the property-box Activity can be interpreted as a kind of regular expression:
the admissible traces of the behaviour of the cruise control repeatedly consists of an
interval where adjustment of speed is not performed, followed by an interval where
the driver activates the cruise control (adjustment of speed still does not take place),
followed by an interval where the driver continuously does not deactivate the cruise
control. Thereby, the temporal predicate dpe holds for those nite or innite intervals
where the predicate p holds in each state. Note that we do not say anything about
whether the cruise control actually ever adjusts speed; we just say when it should not
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Fig. 12. Steps of Stage 3, Variant a: model construction by functional decomposition.
do so. This is typical for specifying model properties, where we are only interested in
selected aspects of the software.
Stage 3: Model construction. In this stage, we construct a model for the cyclic soft-
ware component under consideration. There are several strategies for doing so, which
depend on the problem to solve. Here we consider two variants: model construction
by functional decomposition, and model construction by partitioning behaviour into
operational modes.
Variant 3a: Model construction by functional decomposition. The problem to solve
by the cyclic software component might be more adequately solved by decomposing it
into subproblems, instead of giving a monolithic solution. The reasons for this may be
that the problem is to large to be tackled in a monolithic way, that a decomposition
follows naturally from the structure of the problem, or that existing components should
be integrated into the design.
For a cyclic software component which computes output values from input values
and an internal state, a decomposition is naturally achieved in a functional style, based
on information ow between the subcomponents (Fig. 12). This is also the approach
the Statemate tool supports best.
Step 3a.1: Design functional decomposition using an activity chart. Guidelines
on how to perform a functional decomposition depend on the application. A useful
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Fig. 13. Functional decomposition of cruise control.
approach is data-oriented, and considers intermediate values to be computed by the
subcomponents. If we reuse existing components, these intermediate values are nat-
urally their output interfaces. However, in general, decomposition is a problem that
requires creativity. Hence our agenda suggests to rst design the principle information
ow between subcomponents by drawing an activity chart. The precise specication of
the intermediate interfaces themselves is postponed until the next step. 6
Once an information ow between the subcomponents has been dened, the data
dependencies canonically induce a scheduling as described by the statechart Control
of the template for Step 3a.1 in Fig. 12. Each subcomponent is treated similarly to
a cyclic-software component: once it is resumed, it is expected to compute its output
values and then to suspend itself. The scheduler activates the subcomponents one after
the other in the order induced by the information ow.
The validation conditions associated with this step ensure that the component eventu-
ally produces an output if the subcomponents do so, and that all sensors and actuators
are actually used by the system.
Cruise control. We assume that we can reuse an existing component that implements
a speed adjustment: it calculates a nominal acceleration from a given nominal speed
and the vehicle movement. What is left to do is to introduce a subcomponent which
controls activation and deactivation of the cruise control, and which decides to use
the speed requested by the driver or a speed lower than the nominal speed to keep a
certain safety distance. The decomposition leads to the activity chart given in Fig. 13,
where NominalSpeed is a newly introduced internal interface, ModeControl is the
subcomponent controlling the activation of the cruise control, and SpeedControl is the
reused component.
Step 3a.2: Specify the internal interfaces. In this step, we specify the internal
interfaces as they have been introduced in the last step. This step is similar to the
introduction of interfaces in Stage 1; therefore, details are omitted here.
Step 3a.3: Recursively apply Stage 3. For subcomponents yielded by the decom-
position and which are not reused, we apply Stage 3 again. For the cruise control,
6 This diers from the order used in Stage 1, where we rst specied the interfaces, and then the infor-
mation ow; but there the exact denition of the interfaces had been given by the environment.
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Fig. 14. Steps of Stage 3, Variant b: model construction by mode-based design.
this applies to the subcomponent ModeControl, which we specify using a dierent
sub-agenda, shown in Fig. 14.
Variant 3b: Model construction by mode-based design. The problem to solve by the
software component might be adequately modelled by introducing operational modes
(such as passive, active, emergency, etc.). A cyclic computation then triggers transitions
between the operational modes. The agenda in Fig. 14 describes how to proceed for
this modelling technique.
Step 3b.1: Dene modes by initial statechart. In this step we introduce the dierent
operational modes of the software component. Technically, this is done by dening an
initial statechart (without transitions), where states or combinations of parallel states
represent modes. We introduce this chart before the internal data (next step), because
we might want to specify invariants on the data that depend on the current operational
mode. (in SZ, the predicate instate S can be used to test whether we are in state S).
The initial statechart contains a static reaction which suspends the software whenever
a mode is entered (en(M1) or en(M2)/sd!(SOFTWARE)), signalling to the environ-
ment that the computation of the current cycle has been nished. A static reaction in
Statemate is syntactically similar to a transition label guard/action; semantically, its
action is executed whenever the guard becomes true.
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Fig. 15. Internal data of the ModeControl subcomponent of the cruise control.
Cruise control. The complete statechart with transitions as it is obtained in Step 3b.3
is given in Fig. 16, and will be explained there.
Step 3b.2: Dene internal data state. Internal data is introduced in SZ by a schema
with the DATA role, its initialisation by a schema with the INIT role. The validation
conditions associated with this step stem from the recommended Z methodology [46].
Cruise control. The internal data of the subcomponent ModeControl is dened in
Fig. 15. It declares a variable requestedSpeed, whose value (if dened) describes the
nominal speed which the last time has been requested by the driver. Initially, requested-
Speed is undened.
Step 3b.3: Dene transitions between states of statechart. In this step, we rene
the statechart developed in Step 3b.1 by transitions and possibly by intermediate states.
Transitions are labelled systematically as [G]/Op, where G and Op are Z schemata
introduced with the roles GUARD and OP, respectively.
Due to the static reaction introduced in Step 3b.1, the software is suspended whenever
a transition reaches a state corresponding to an operational mode. Intermediate states do
not necessarily lead to a suspension, as it is the case, e.g., for the internal state S in the
template for Step 3b.3 in Fig. 14. The validation conditions associated with this step
require the developer to check if all inputs are treated appropriately, and to show that
the system behaves deterministically. Moreover, useless states that cannot be reached
are not allowed. An important condition to check is whether mode transitions terminate,
that is starting from any mode, for all possible inputs another mode is reached in a
nite number of steps. The template state-chart given for Step 3b.3 in Fig. 14 shows
that this condition is not trivial if intermediate states are used (it is possible that the
process hangs in state S).
Cruise control. Applying Step 3b.3 to the subcomponent ModeControl leads to the
statechart, guards and operations given in Fig. 16. The statechart does not contain inter-
mediate states. The cartesian product of the state sets fACTIVATED;DEACTIVATEDg
and fREQUESTED; CALCULATEDg makes up the set of operational modes. In addi-
tion to the declared objects, we use the following Z constants: stepSpeed : SPEED is
the oset how to increase or decrease the requested speed, and maxSpeed : SPEED
is the maximum requested speed the cruise control is allowed to manage. The func-
tion safeDistance : SPEED! LENGTH yields the safe distance to a vehicle ahead in
dependency of a driving speed.
The output value of the port NominalSpeed is specied by the property given in
Fig. 17. In dependency of the operational mode implied by the statechart, nominal-
Speed is not set, set to the requested speed, or to a regulated speed. The function
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Fig. 16. Modes and transitions of the ModeControl subcomponent.
distanceRegulator : MovementAhead ! SPEED represents an algorithm calculating
a nominal speed from the movement of the vehicle and information about a vehicle
ahead.
Discussion. We have demonstrated that the agenda approach supports the systematic
development of requirement specications for high-quality embedded systems on a non-
trivial level of detail which gives substantial guidance to developers. As already noted,
agendas are not intended to replace creativity and do not aim at completely automating
development processes. Hence, in the rst steps of an agenda, high-level decisions have
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Fig. 17. Output of the ModeControl subcomponent.
to be taken. The validation conditions associated with the early steps of an agenda are
mostly informal, encouraging developers to carefully re-consider their decisions, see
e.g. Step 1.1 of the agenda of Fig. 5. Later steps in an agenda, on the other hand,
often have validation conditions associated with them that can be formally expressed
and proven. The reason is that in the later steps consistency conditions between the
various parts of the specication that are already developed can be stated. Step 1.2 of
the agenda shown in Fig. 5 is an example. Finally, some steps of an agenda (usually
the last steps) can be performed in an entirely schematic way, because they merely
consist in an appropriate combination of parts of the specication developed in earlier
steps, see e.g. Step 1.3 of the agenda of Fig. 6.
5. Related work
Our work relates to methodological aspects of software engineering in general, and
to approaches to formally specify safety-critical systems.
5.1. Development methods
Other approaches to make software engineering more systematic can be divided into
product- and process-oriented approaches.
5.1.1. Product-oriented approaches
Recently, eorts have been made to support re-use of special kinds of software de-
velopment knowledge: Design patterns [12] have had much success in object-oriented
software construction. They represent frequently used ways to combine classes or as-
sociate objects to achieve a certain purpose. Furthermore, in the eld of software
architecture [39], architectural styles have been dened that capture frequently used
design principles for software systems. Apart from the fact that these concepts are
more specialised in their application than agendas, the main dierence is that design
patterns and architectural styles do not describe processes but products.
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A prominent example of knowledge-based software engineering, whose aims closely
resemble our own, is the Programmer’s Apprentice project [38]. There, programming
knowledge is represented by cliches, which are prototypical examples of the artifacts
in question. The programming task is performed by \inspection" { i.e., by choosing
an appropriate cliche and customising it. In comparison to cliches, agendas are more
process-oriented.
5.1.2. Process-oriented approaches
Chernack [7] uses a concept called checklist to support inspection processes. In
contrast to agendas, checklists presuppose the existence of a software artifact and aim
at detecting defects in this artifact.
Potts [35] aims at capturing not only strategic but also heuristic aspects of design
methods. He uses issue-based information systems (IBIS) [8] as a representation for-
malism for design methods. IBIS representing heuristics tend to be specialised for
particular application domains, and it is not clear how much of an IBIS can be re-used
for similar applications.
Johnson and Feather [26] take a transformational approach to supporting the speci-
cation process. Starting out from a simple initial specication, evolution transforma-
tions are applied. These may change the semantics of the specication and add more
detail to it. Compared to these, agendas are concepts of a higher level of abstraction
and closer to human reasoning.
Related to our aim to provide methodological support for applying formal techniques
is the work of Souquieres and Levy [41]. They support specication acquisition with
development operators that reduce tasks to subtasks. However, their approach is limited
to specication acquisition, and the development operators do not provide means to
validate the developed specication.
Astesiano and Reggio [1] also emphasise the importance of method when using
formal techniques. They set up a method pattern for formal specication, consisting of
context, formalism, and pragmatics. Pragmatics, in turn, contain rationale, guidelines,
presentation, and documentation. Guidelines (see [37] for an example) correspond to
the steps of an agenda (i.e., an agenda without dependency graph, templates, and
validation conditions).
Wile’s [43] development language Paddle provides a means of describing procedures
for transforming specications into programs. Since carrying out a process specied in
Paddle involves executing the corresponding program, one disadvantage of this procedu-
ral representation of process knowledge is that it enforces a strict depth-rst left-to-right
processing of the goal structure. The \second generation" process language JIL [42] is
more exible in this respect: not only proactive (i.e., xed) but also reactive control
specications can be given. Representing processes as programs has the advantage that
processes are formal objects on which reasoning can be performed. On the other hand,
humans nd it easier to follow instructions when they are expressed on a higher level
of abstraction than a programming notation can provide.
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Process languages are widely used in the eld of software process modelling (e.g.
[10,11]). Software process modelling aims at automated support for software develop-
ment processes on the level of company processes. The goal is to execute software pro-
cesses like software [33]. This goal implies that the language used to express processes
should be similar to a programming language. Typical activities that are considered in
software process modelling are lling in forms, sending emails, using a version control
system to check in or check out les, or starting an editor or another tool. In contrast,
agendas do not consider company processes but single documents and their seman-
tics. They structure activities that need creativity and do not lend themselves easily
to automatic enactment. Therefore, programming language notations are not necessary
to express them. All in all, agendas describe activities that are considered atomic in
software process modelling. Hence, process modelling techniques are a useful comple-
ment to agendas. To obtain realistic processes for larger projects, they should always
be used in combination.
Humphrey [24] has devised the personal software process to improve the perfor-
mance of software engineers. Software engineers are trained to plan and analyze their
activities and to perform measurements on them. Personal strengths and weaknesses are
identied. Based on this knowledge, software engineers improve their personal skills.
The personal software process approach is centred around individuals, not around ac-
tivities, as agendas are. As with process modelling techniques, the two approaches do
not exclude but complement each other. The methods captured in agendas can only be
worked out by highly competent individuals.
5.2. Safety-critical systems
Moser’s and Melliar-Smith’s approach to the formal verication of safety-critical
systems [31] comprises the specication, design and implementation phases. They use
a reliability model for the processors that execute the program. This enables them to
take computer failures into account, an aspect we do not address. On the other hand,
their approach does not cover the validation of the top-level specication, an issue that
we pay particular attention to.
The use of model-based languages like Z or VDM [27] in the area of system safety
has been thoroughly investigated. Several case studies use VDM, e.g. the British gov-
ernment regulations for storing explosives [32], a railway interlocking system [15], and
a water-level monitoring system [44]. Mukherjee’s and Stavridou’s as well as Hansen’s
work, however, focus on adequately modelling safety requirements, independently of
the question of whether software is employed or not. Consequently, they do not discuss
issues specic to the construction of safety-critical software.
Jacky [25] uses Z to dene a framework for safety-critical systems that emphasises
safety interlocking. McDermid and Pierce [29] dene a graphical notation based on
a variant of statecharts [16] that is translated into Z for the purpose of mechanical
validation. This notation is used to specify and develop software for programmable logic
controllers. Halang and Kramer [14] also focus on programmable logic controllers. They
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describe a development process, from the formalisation of requirements to the testing
of the constructed program. They use the specication language Obj and the Hoare
calculus, and their choice is motivated by the available tool support. The specication
language Obj is weaker than SZ because Obj only allows conditional equations to be
stated.
Ravn et al. [36] use the duration calculus to express functional requirements and
safety constraints. The duration calculus is a real-time interval logic based on state
durations. A system is modelled by a collection of state variables that are functions
of time, modelled by real numbers. System requirements are specied by means of
duration formulas that are predicates containing integrals over state assertions (pred-
icates on state variables). This form of specication allows to specify requirements
like critical durations of system states or progress and stability requirements. Its most
serious drawbacks are, rst, that the system state is constituted by a plain set of state
variables. Second, (at least in the requirements specication) no means are provided
to hierarchally decompose a system.
Heisel and Suhl [21,22] use a combination of Z and real-time CSP [9] to formally
specify software for embedded real-time systems. Their reference architectures and
agendas are similar to the one used in ESPRESS.
6. Conclusions
Agendas provide more than a process description. They are an overall documentation
of processes and products, and they are easily adjusted to similar problems. Agendas
together with templates combine both process and product oriented approaches (see
Section 5.1).
Besides providing guidance for developers and ensuring some application indepen-
dent quality aspects of the developed product, agendas oer the following advantages:
 Agendas make software processes explicit; comprehensible; and assessable. Giving
concrete steps to perform an activity and dening the dependencies between the
steps make processes explicit. The process becomes comprehensible for third parties
because the purpose of the various steps is described informally in the agenda. Thus,
agendas may be subject to evaluation.
 Agendas standardise processes and products of software development. Agendas
structure development processes. The development of an artifact following an agenda
always proceeds in a way consistent with the steps of the agenda and their depen-
dencies. Thus, processes supported by agendas are standardised. The same holds for
the products: since applying an agenda results in instantiating the templates given in
the agenda, all products developed with an agenda have a similar structure.
 Agendas support maintenance and evolution of the developed artifacts. Understand-
ing a document developed by another person is less dicult when the document
was developed following an agenda than without such information. Each part of the
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document can be traced back to a step in the agenda, which reveals its purpose.
To change the document, the agenda can be \replayed". The agenda helps focus
attention on the parts that actually are subject to change.
 Agendas are a promising starting point for sophisticated machine support. They
can form the basis of a process-centred software engineering environment (PSEE)
[13]. Such a tool would lead its users through the process described by the agenda.
Agendas are language-independent to a large extent. Changing the language in which
the developed specication is expressed consists mostly in replacing the templates of
the various steps, and eects the steps themselves very little, see the agenda presented
in [20].
The validation conditions are a very important aspect of agendas. Clearly, the errors
revealed by failing to demonstrate validations conditions of an agenda can only be of
an application-independent nature. Checking the validation conditions cannot guarantee,
e.g., that a system is adequately modelled by a developed specication. Nevertheless,
many common errors can be discovered. As reported by Heitmeyer et al. [23], in
the certication of the Darlington plant (which cost $40M), \the reviewers spent too
much of their time and energy checking for simple, application-independent properties".
To improve this situation, Heitmeyer et al. have implemented a tool that performs
consistency checks. Since this tool is not tailored for any application domain, it can
only check very general consistency conditions. In comparison, the validation conditions
provided by agendas are much more to the point (see e.g. the validation conditions
of Step 3.b.3 of the agenda shown in Fig. 14), such that more specic tool support
for checking validation conditions generated by agendas is conceivable. But even if
no specic support tools for agendas are available, agendas allow developers to use
existing tools, e.g., Statemate to check the specication by simulation, or type checkers
and theorem provers for Z to check some of the formal validation conditions.
For these reasons, agendas play a central role in the ESPRESS methodology, and
we have used the agenda approach for supporting further activities of the general
development process as shown in Fig. 1. An agenda has been developed for the activity
of safety analyses, which is based on common techniques such as FTA (failure-tree
analysis) and SHARD (software hazard analysis and resolution design).
Cyclic software components, though important in practice, are indeed a rather simple
software architecture. An extension of our agenda for this architecture to certain kinds
of event-triggered software components, which are also studied in the case studies of
ESPRESS [4], has been developed in [45]. Signicant parts of the agenda given in this
paper, in particular from Stage 1, context embedding, and Stage 2, quality requirements,
have been reused.
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